Learning More About the Underground Economy : A Case-Study of Keyloggers and Dropzones by Holz, Thorsten et al.
Reihe Informatik. TR-2008-006
Learning More About the Underground Economy:
A Case-Study of Keyloggers and Dropzones
Thorsten Holz Markus Engelberth Felix Freiling
University of Mannheim
Laboratory for Dependable System
{holz|engelberth|freiling}@informatik.uni-mannheim.de
December 18, 2008
Abstract
We study an active underground economy that trades stolen digital credentials.We present a method
with which it is possible to directly analyze the amount of data harvested through these types of attacks
in a highly automated fashion. We exemplify this method by applying it to keylogger-based stealing
of credentials via dropzones, anonymous collection points of illicitly collected data. Based on the col-
lected data from more than 70 dropzones, we present the first empirical study of this phenomenon,
giving many first-hand details about the attacks that were observed during a seven-month period be-
tween April and October 2008. This helps us better understand the nature and size of these quickly
emerging underground marketplaces.
1 Introduction
Today, the Internet is driving a new digital economy of services that offer a degree of flexibility unmatched
by traditional service providers, like online banking, digital communities, and online trading forums. It
is well-known that this economy moves enormous amounts of money and that the market share of digital
business is growing rapidly every year [11].
With the growing digital economy, it comes as no surprise that criminal activities in digital business
have lead to a digital underground economy. Because it is such a fast-moving field, tracking and under-
standing this underground economy is extremely difficult. Martin and Thomas [21] gave a first insight
into the economy of trading stolen credit card credentials over open IRC channels. The “blatant manner”
in which the trading is performed with “no need to hide” [21] is in fact staggering. A large-scale study
of similar forms of online activity was later performed by Franklin et al. [12]. The result of this study is
that Internet-based crime is now largely profit-driven and that “the nature of this activity has expanded
and evolved to a point where it exceeds the capacity of a closed group” [12]. In other words, digital and
classical crime are merging. Even in the presence of previous studies [21, 12] it is hard to estimate the real
size of the underground economy. This is because previous work has only measured indirect effects of
underground markets. For example, both studies did not observe real trading, but only announcements of
trading and offers of stolen credentials in public IRC channels. Another question raised by these studies
is how much of the offered data really belongs to online scams—rather than being just the result of “poor
scum nigerians and romanians try[ing] to make 20$ deals by ripping eachother off” [4].
In this paper, we present a method that allows us to observe the actual kind and amount of data
that is stolen by attackers from compromised machines, not only the results of trading this data. These
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are the goods that can be traded at an underground market. This data gives us a much better basis for
estimating the size of the underground economy. In particular, we focus on the newly emerging threat
of keyloggers that communicate with the attacker through so-called dropzones. A dropzone is a publicly
writable directory on a server in the Internet that serves as an exchange point for keylogger data: the
malware running on a compromised machine sends all stolen credentials to the dropzone, where the
attacker can pick them up and start to abuse them [10, 31, 32]. Our method to analyze keylogger-based
attacks is based on executing malware within an instrumented environment [36], extracting the location
of the dropzone, and harvesting the keylogger data on our own (if possible). All this is done in a highly
automated manner and we applied it to two different classes of keyloggers to demonstrate the practical
feasibility of our method.
We present in this paper the first empirical study of this phenomenon, giving many details about these
attacks we observed during a seven-month period between April and October 2008. In particular, we
were able to harvest a total of 33 GB of keylogger data from more than 70 unique dropzones, resulting in
information about stolen credentials from more than 173,000 compromised machines. As an additional
contribution we present the results of a statistical analysis of this data. To our knowledge, this is the first
time that it has been possible to perform such an analysis on stolen data on such a large scale. It gives
rather credible answers to questions about the type and the amount of data criminals steal, which allows
us to study the underground economy since these stolen credentials are marketable goods. For example,
we recovered more than 10,700 stolen online bank account credentials and over 149,000 stolen email
passwords, potentially worth several million dollars on the underground market. Our analysis shows that
this type of cybercrime is a profitable business, allowing an attacker to earn hundreds of dollars per day.
The analysis method presented in this paper is not restricted to keylogger-based attacks, it can be
applied to all attacks in which an attacker steals authentication credentials of a victim after some initial
form of contact. We call these types of attacks impersonation attacks. This class covers a wide range of
real-world attacks including many different forms of phishing, certain forms of sending spam, or online-
fraud based on identity theft.
1.1 Related Work
In the field of phishing prevention and mitigation, there has been some work specific to attacks based
on email and fake websites [5, 13]. Chandrasekaran et al. [5] generate fake input and investigate a site’s
response to detect phishing sites. Gajek and Sadeghi [13] use fake credentials to track down phishers.
Our work is complementary to this work: we study the actual dropzone, i.e., the site where the stolen
credentials are stored, and infer from this data more information about the extent and size of the attack.
Jakobsson introduces phishing graphs to model phishing attacks [16]. In such a graph, nodes corre-
spond to knowledge or access rights, and (directed) edges correspond to means of obtaining information
or access rights from already possessed information or access rights. This enables the study of different
kinds of phishing attacks and an economic analysis on the viability of attacks. In contrast, our model is
more general and captures the whole class of impersonation attacks, for which phishing is an instantiation.
Furthermore, we focus on the goal of the attacker, i.e., stealing of credentials.
Impersonation attacks can be stopped using different kinds of techniques, for example multi-factor
authentication, biometrics, or special hardware or software. While techniques like SpoofGuard [7], Dy-
namic Security Skins [9], or Transport Login Protocol [6] can protect against certain forms of imperson-
ation attacks, e.g., classical phishing attacks, they can not stop keylogger-based attacks that we study in
this paper. Preventing this kind of attacks is harder since the user machine itself is compromised, which
allows the malicious software to steal credentials directly as the victim performs the login procedure.
Modern keylogger also defeat simple tricks to conceal the entered password as proposed by Herley and
Floreˆncio [14]. However, malware prevention methods and systems that protect confidential information
can defend against this kind of attacks [22, 34].
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1.2 Summary of Contributions
To summarize, our work presented in this paper makes the following two main contributions:
1. We present a method to analyze a large class of credential-stealing attacks (impersonation attacks)
in an highly automated fashion.
2. We apply this method to the case of keylogging attacks based on dropzones and provide a detailed
analysis of the collected data, giving a novel and first-hand insight into the underground economy
of Internet criminals from a unique and novel viewpoint.
We argue that combined with prices from the underground economy, our study gives a more precise
estimate of the dangers and potential of the black market than indirect measures. Together with previous
studies, we hope that our results help to relinquish the common mindset we often see with politicians and
commercial decision-makers that we do not need to track down and prosecute these criminals because it
is too costly. We feel that the sheer size of the underground economy now and in the future will not allow
us to neglect it.
Paper Outline. The paper is structured as follows: We first define the class of impersonation attacks in
Sect. 2. Then in Sect. 3 we perform a case study of a particular form of impersonation attack: stealing
credentials using keyloggers and dropzones. We analyze the collected data in Sect. 4 and briefly conclude
the paper in Sect. 5.
Data Protection and Privacy Concerns. The nature of data analyzed during this study is very sensitive
and often contains personal data of individual victims. We are not in a position to inform each victim
about the security breach and therefore decided to hand over the full data set to AusCERT, Australia’s
National Computer Emergency Response Team. This CERT works together with different banks and
other providers to inform the victims. We hope that the data collected during this study can help to
recover from the incidents and more damage is prevented.
2 Impersonation Attacks
2.1 Terminology
We focus on a specific class of attacks that we call impersonation attacks. In such attacks, there are
three different actors (see Fig. 1 for a schematic overview): The first actor is the provider P of some
online service like an online bank, an online trading platform (like eBay or Amazon), an Internet service
provider, or even a social network (like Facebook). The second actor is the victim V , a registered user of
the service provided by P . To ensure only authorized access to its services, P performs authentication
prior to granting access to its services. For this reason, P has granted V authentication credentials c after
registration. Using c it is possible to authenticate as user V towards P . The third (and final) actor is
the attacker A. The goal of A is to enjoy the service of P in an unauthorized way. More specifically,
A wants to use P ’s service by pretending to be V . To do this, A needs V ’s credentials c. So to mount
a successful impersonation attack, A has to get hold of c. This means that there must exist a (possibly
indirect) communication channel from V to A over which information about c can flow. We call this
channel the harvesting channel. Apart from the harvesting channel there also exists another (possibly
indirect) communication channel from A to V . This channel is used by the attacker to initiate or trigger
an impersonation attack. We call this channel the attack channel.
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Figure 1: Structure of impersonation attacks.
2.2 Examples
Impersonation attacks cover a wide variety of real-world attacks. The classic example is phishing: In
classical phishing, P is a bank and c are login credentials to an online banking website like an account
number and password, possibly together with one or more transaction numbers. The attack channel
is usually a spoofed email asking V to check or correct his login credentials and pointing him to a
particular (fake) website. This website is part of the harvesting channel. The user enters c into the
website, disclosing his credentials. This information is then either stored locally on the webserver or
directly sent to A, e.g., via email to an account the attacker controls.
Another form of attack channel involves exploiting cross-site scripting errors in websites which allow,
for example, to redirect victims to other websites where they enter (and thus disclose) their credentials.
A more basic attack channel is using any form of social engineering to persuade V to send c to A (e.g.,
by having A call V on the phone).
Variants of classical phishing involve different types of attack and harvesting channels. For example,
the attack channel can consist of the infection of V by a piece of malicious software crafted by A. This
can for example be achieved with the help of drive-by downloads via malicious websites [35] or sending
the software to the victim in an email attachment. The malicious software itself can contain keylogging
functionality that saves V ’s keystrokes (including the credentials c) to a file which is sent to A by means
of email or HTTP POST requests in regular intervals (harvesting channel). A popular harvesting channel
today is called a dropzone. Dropzones are publicly writable directories on servers in the Internet. Instead
of sending keylogger data directly to A, the malware at V “drops” the data into the directory at regular
intervals. The attacker regularly accesses the dropzone, downloads this data, and extracts c.
In a variant of phishing via keyloggers, the provider P is an Internet service provider offering a mail
relay server to send email. The credentials c there consist of V ’s username and password for the mail
relay. These are used by A to send spam disguising as V .
2.3 Analysis Method
Our goal is to analyze impersonation attacks with a general method. The method we propose in this paper
is based on the analysis of the harvesting channel. To do this, the harvesting channel must be identified
first. To identify the harvesting channel we basically have two options. The first option consists of
collaborating with V . For example, V could provide access to its network interface which we can monitor
to extract information about the harvesting channel. The second option is to play the role of V ourselves.
For example, we can setup a dedicated environment in which we imitate V . In this environment, we
first need to emulate the infection process, i.e., fall for the attacks targeting V over the attacker channel.
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Figure 2: Schematic overview of impersonation attacks which use keyloggers as attack channel and a
dropzone as harvesting channel.
In the second phase, we need to automatically analyze the attacks observed on the attack channel to
extract information about the harvesting channel. We will use this approach later in Sect. 3 to identify
and automatically analyze the harvesting channel and show that the process can be automated to a high
degree with very little human interaction needed.
3 Case Study: Impersonation Attacks Using Keyloggers
In this section, we show that the methodology we introduced in Sect. 2 can be applied to different kinds
of impersonation attacks and is thus very general. In particular, we show how to efficiently analyze
attack schemes that use malware in the form of keyloggers as attack channel and dropzones as harvesting
channel. Fig. 2 provides a schematic overview of this kind of attacks. Each victim Vi has a specific
credential cij to authenticate at provider Pj to use the service. For example, P1 is an online banking
website and V1 uses his account number and a password to log in. The attackerA uses different techniques
to infect each victim Vi with a keylogger. This can for example be with the help of a spam mail that
contains a copy of the keylogger in an attachment, installing the keylogger with the help of a drive-by
download on a malicious website, or other attack vectors. Once the victim Vi is infected, the keylogger
starts to record all relevant keystrokes: A defines in advance which keystrokes should be logged and the
malware only records these. For example, A can specify that only the login process of an online banking
website should be recorded. The malware then observes the values entered in input fields on the banking
website and sends this information to a dropzone. This dropzone is the central collection site for all
harvested information. The attacker can access the dropzone, extract the stolen credentials, and use them
to impersonate at Pj as Vi.
5
3.1 Studying the Attack and Harvesting Channel
The practical challenge of the methodology presented in this paper is to automate the analysis of the attack
and harvesting channel as much as possible. To study the attack channel, we use the concept of honeypots,
i.e., information system resources whose value lies in unauthorized or illicit use of that resource [28]. We
play the role of a victim Vi and react on incoming attacks the same way a legitimate victim would do.
For example, we use spamtraps, i.e., email accounts used to collect spam, and open email attachments to
emulate the infection process of malware that propagates with the help of spam. Furthermore, we also
visit links contained in spam mails with client-side honeypots to examine whether or not the spammed
URL is malicious and the website tries to install a keylogger via a drive-by download [29, 35]. Using
these techniques, our honeypot can be infected with a keylogger in an automated way and we obtain
information about the attack channel.
After a successful infection, we extract the sample from the honeypot for further analysis of the har-
vesting channel. We choose dynamic analysis based on a dedicated analysis tool called CWSandbox [36]
since static analysis can be defeated by malware using many different techniques [18, 25, 27]. CWSand-
box executes the malware in a controlled environment and analyzes the behavior of the sample during
runtime by observing the system calls issued by the sample. As a result, we obtain an analysis report
that includes for example information about changes of the filesystem or the Windows registry, and all
network communication generated by the sample during the observation period.
When executing, the keylogger typically first contacts the dropzone to retrieve configuration informa-
tion. The configuration file commonly includes a list of websites that should be monitored for credentials
and similar customization options for the malware. From an attacker’s perspective, such a modus operandi
is desirable since she does not have to hardcode all configuration options during the attack phase, but can
dynamically re-configure which credentials should be stolen after the initial infection. This enables more
flexibility since the attacker can configure the infected machines on demand. By executing the keylogger
within our analysis environment, we can thus detect the harvesting channel and identify the dropzone in
an automated way since the keylogger contacts the dropzone at an early stage after starting.
However, certain families of keylogger already contain all necessary configuration details and do not
contact the dropzone: only after keystrokes that represent a credential are observed by these keyloggers,
they send the harvested information to the dropzone. Furthermore, we do not only want to detect the
harvesting channel, but also learn more about it. So in order to study the harvesting channel in a more
automated fashion, we need some sort of user simulation to actually simulate a victim V . Note that we do
not need to generically simulate the full behavior of a user, but only simulate the aspects of user interaction
that are relevant for keyloggers, e.g., entering credentials in an online banking application or logging into
a webmail account. The keylogger then monitors this behavior and sends the collected information to the
dropzone, and we have successfully identified the location of a dropzone in an automated way.
3.2 Improving Detection of Harvesting Channel by Simulating User Behavior
We developed a tool called SimUser to simulate the behavior of a victim Vi after an infection with a
keylogger. The core of SimUser is based on AutoIt, a scripting language designed for automating the
Windows GUI and general scripting [1]. It uses a combination of simulated keystrokes, mouse movement,
and window/control manipulation in order to automate tasks. We use AutoIt to simulate arbitrary user
behavior and implemented SimUser as a frontend to enable efficient generation of user profiles. SimUser
itself uses the concept of behavior templates that encapsulate an atomic user task, e.g., opening a website
and entering a username/password combination in the form fields to log in, or authenticating against an
email server and retrieving emails. We implemented 17 behavior templates that cover typical user tasks
which require a credential. These templates can be combined in an arbitrary way to generate a profile that
simulates user behavior according to specific needs.
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In order to improve our analysis of the harvesting channel, we execute the keylogger sample for
several minutes under the observation of CWSandbox. During the execution, SimUser simulates the
behavior of a victim, which browses to several websites and fills out login forms. In the current version,
different online banking sites, free webmail providers, as well as social networking sites are visited.
Furthermore, CWSandbox was extended to also simulate certain aspects of user activity, e.g., generic
clicking on buttons to automatically react on user dialogues. We also store several different credentials
in the Windows Protected Storage (PStore) of the analysis machine as some kind of honeytoken. PStore
provides applications with an interface to store user data [23] and many applications store credentials like
username/password combinations there. By depositing some credentials in PStore, we can potentially
trigger on more keyloggers: by offering more bait, we can learn more about the malware.
Simulating user behavior enables us to learn more about the results of a keylogger infection and we
can also analyze some properties of the harvesting channel, e.g., we can detect on which sites it triggers
and what kind of credentials are stolen. The whole process can be fully automated and we analyzed more
than 2,000 keylogger samples with our tools as explained in Sect. 4. Different families of keyloggers can
potentially use distinct encodings to transfer the stolen credentials to the dropzone and the dropzone itself
uses different techniques to store all stolen information. In order to fully analyze the dropzone and the data
contained there, we thus need to manually analyze the harvesting channel once per family to improve our
understanding of the harvesting channel. This knowledge can then be used to extract more information
from the dropzone for all samples of this particular family. To provide evidence of the feasibility of this
approach, we analyzed two families of keyloggers in detail, as we explain in the next section. Note that
even if we cannot fully decode the harvesting channel, we can nevertheless reliably identify the network
location of the dropzone based on the information collected during dynamic analysis. This information
is already valuable since it can be used for mitigating the dropzone, the simplest approach to close the
harvesting channel.
3.3 Technical Details for Analyzed Keyloggers
To exemplify a technical realization of the methodology introduced in this paper, we analyzed in de-
tail two different families of keyloggers that are widespread in today’s Internet: Limbo/Nethell and
ZeuS/Zbot/Wsnpoem. Both families use distinct attack and harvesting channels and we provide a short
overview of both families in this section.
Limbo/Nethell. This family of malware typically uses malicious websites and drive-by download attacks
as attack channel to infect the victims who are lured by social engineering tricks to visit these websites.
The malware itself is implemented as a browser helper object (BHO), i.e., a plugin for Internet Explorer
that can respond to browser events such as navigation, keystrokes, and page loads. With the help of
the interface provided by the browser, Limbo can access the Document Object Model (DOM) of the
current page and identify sensitive fields which should be monitored for credentials (form grabbing).
This enables the malware to monitor the content of these fields and defeats simple tricks to conceal the
entered password as proposed by Herley and Floreˆncio [14]. The malware offers a flexible configuration
option since the sites to be monitored can be specified during runtime in a configuration file. Upon startup,
the malware contacts the dropzone to retrieve the current configuration options from there. Furthermore,
this malware has the capability to extract information from the Protected Storage and to steal cookies.
Once a credential is found, the harvested information is sent to the dropzone. The harvesting chan-
nel is implemented via HTTP requests to a specific PHP script installed at the dropzone, e.g., http:
//example.org/datac.php?userid=21102008_110432_2025612. This example depicts the ini-
tial request right after a successful infection with which the keylogger registers the newly compromised
victim. The userid parameter encodes the infection date and time, and also a random victim ID. By
observing the network communication during the analysis phase, we can thus automatically determine the
dropzone. The dropzone itself is implemented as a web application that allows the attacker amongst other
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entry "WebFilters"
"https://www.gruposantander.es/*"
"https://internetbanking.gad.de/*/portal
"!http://*myspace.com*"
"@https://caionline.cai.es/*"
end
entry "WebFakes"
"https://sitekey.bankofamerica.com/sas/"
"http://192.168.2.1/fk/US/bofa.php"
end
entry "DnsMap"
;127.0.0.1 downloads1.kaspersky-labs.com
;127.0.0.1 www.symantec.com
end
Figure 3: Excerpt of ZeuS configuration file.
tasks to browse through all collected information, search for specific credentials, or instruct the victims
to download and execute files. We found that these web applications often contain typical configuration
errors like for example world-readable directory listings that lead to insecure setups, which we can exploit
to obtain access to the full data set. An example of (sanitized) information stolen by Limbo infections is
shown in Appendix A.
ZeuS/Zbot/Wsnpoem. The attack channel for this family of malware is spam mails that contain a copy of
the keylogger as an attachment. The emails use common social engineering tricks, e.g., pretending to be
an electronic invoice, in order to trick the victim into opening the attachment. In contrast to Limbo, which
uses rather simple techniques to steal credentials, ZeuS is technically more advanced: the malware injects
itself into all user space processes and hides its presence. Once it is successfully injected into Internet
Explorer, it intercepts HTTP POST requests to observe transmitted credentials. This malware also steals
information from cookies and the Protected Storage. All collected information is periodically sent to the
dropzone via HTTP requests, which forms the harvesting channel. The dropzone itself is implemented
as a web application and the stolen credentials are either stored in the filesystem or in a database. Again,
insecure setups enable the access to the full dropzone data. An example of (sanitized) information stolen
by ZeuS infections is shown in Appendix B.
Similar to Limbo, ZeuS can also be dynamically re-configured: after starting up, the malware retrieves
the current configuration file from the dropzone. Fig. 3 provides an excerpt of such a configuration file.
The WebFilters section configures which sites should be monitored (or not be monitored with the ! sign).
The @ sign denotes websites for which a screenshot of 50x50 pixel around the mouse pointer should be
taken at every left-click of the mouse. This capability is implemented to defeat visual keyboards, i.e.,
instead of entering the sensitive information via the keyboard, they can be entered via mouse clicks. This
technique is used by different banks and defeats typical keyloggers. However, by taking a screenshot
around the current position of the mouse, an attacker can also obtain these credentials. The WebFakes
section configures man-in-the-middle attacks: each time the victim opens the first URL, the request is
transparently redirected to the second URL, which hosts some kind of phishing website that tricks the
victim into disclosing even more credentials. Several other configuration options like DNS modification
on the victim’s machine or update functionality are available.
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3.4 Studying Other Types of Impersonation Attacks
Besides impersonation attacks which use keylogger and dropzones, there are many other forms of this
attack that can also be analyzed with the method we propose in this paper. For example, to study classical
phishing attacks, we need to analyze phishing mails since they constitute the attack channel. To learn
more about the harvesting channel, we open the spammed URL in a honeyclient and can thus automat-
ically identify the phishing website. A recent study by Cova et al. shows that phishing sites commonly
use email as dropping technique [8]. By analyzing the phishing kit used during a specific attack, we can
identify this part of the harvesting channel and identify the email account that is used to store the stolen
credentials. Typically it is then not possible to fully study the dropzone since we commonly cannot access
this email account. We thus obtain a limited view into the harvesting channel, but the information about
the account can already be used for mitigation purposes.
There are keylogger-based impersonation attacks that use email as the harvesting channel. For this
kind of attacks, we can study the attack channel with the methods outlined above. Again, the harvesting
channel itself can be automatically identified by using dynamic analysis: when starting the keylogger in
CWSandbox and simulating user activity with SimUser, we potentially trigger the submission of logged
credentials. We can thus automatically identify the email account used as drop account. Similar to
classical phishing with email as drop technique, we can not obtain a detailed insight into the harvesting
channel, but can nevertheless reliably identify the drop email account which can then be mitigated.
4 Results
In this section, we report on the results of a systematic study of impersonation attacks using keylogger
and a dropzone as outlined in the previous sections. All data was collected during a seven-month period
between April and October 2008.
4.1 General Statistics
With the help of CWSandbox, we analyzed more than 2,000 unique keylogger samples collected with
different kinds of spamtraps and honeypots, and user submissions at cwsandbox.org in the period be-
tween April and October 2008. Based on the generated analysis reports, we detected more than 140
unique Limbo dropzones and 205 unique ZeuS dropzones. To study these dropzones, we implemented a
monitoring system that periodically collects information like for example the configuration file.
For 69 Limbo and 4 ZeuS dropzones we were able to fully access the harvesting channel, i.e., we had
access to all logfiles collected at that particular dropzone. We also periodically collected this information
to study the amount and kind of stolen credentials to get a better understanding of the data stolen by
attackers during such impersonation attacks. In total, our monitoring system collected 28 GB of Limbo
and 5 GB of ZeuS logfiles during the measurement period.
Limbo. To understand the typical victims of keylogger attacks, we performed a statistical analysis of the
collected data. The number of unique infected machines and the amount of stolen information per Limbo
dropzone for which we had full access is summarized in Tab. 1. In total, we collected information about
more than 164,000 infected machines. The table is sorted by the number of unique infected machines and
contains a detailed overview of the top four dropzones. Note that an infected machine can potentially be
used by many users, compromising the credentials of many victims. Furthermore, the effective number
of infected machines might be higher since we might not observe all infected machines during the mea-
surement period. The numbers are thus a lower bound on the actual number of infected machines for a
given dropzone. The amount of information collected per dropzone greatly varies since it heavily depends
on the configuration of the keylogger (e.g., what kind of credentials should be harvested) and the time
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we monitored the server. The dropzones themselves are located in many different Autonomous Systems
(AS) and no single AS dominates. The country distribution reveals that many dropzones are located in
Asia or Russia, but we found also many dropzones located in the US.
Dropzone # Infected machines Data amount AS # Country Lifetime in days
webpinkXXX.cn 26,150 1.5 GB 4837 China 36
coXXX-google.cn 12,460 1.2 GB 17464 Malaysia 53
77.XXX.159.202 10,394 503 MB 30968 Russian 99
finXXXonline.com 6,932 438 MB 39823 Estonia 133
Other 108,122 24.4 GB
Total 164,058 28.0GB 61
Table 1: Statistical overview of largest Limbo dropzones, sorted according to the total number of infected
machines.
We also examined the lifetime for each dropzone and the infection lifetime of all victims, i.e., the total
time a given machine is infected with Limbo. Each logfile of a dropzone contains records that include
a unique victim ID and a timestamp, which indicates when the corresponding harvesting process was
started. As the infection lifetime of a victim we define the interval between the timestamp of the last
and first record caused by this particular victim. This is the lower bound of the total time of infection
since we may not be able to observe all log files from this particular infection and thus underestimate the
real infection time. The interval between the last and the first timestamp seen on the whole dropzone is
defined as the lifetime of this dropzone. Using these definitions, the average infection time of a victim
is about 2 days. This is only a coarse lower bound since we often observe an infected machine only a
limited amount of time. The maximum lifetime of a Limbo victim we observed was more than 111 days.
In contrast, the average lifetime of a dropzones is approximately 61 days.
Fig. 4a depicts the cumulative distribution of IP addresses for infected machines based on the more
than 164,000 Limbo victims we detected. The distribution is highly non-uniform: The majority of victims
are located in the IP address ranges between 58.* – 92.* and 189.* – 220.*. Surprisingly, this is consistent
with similar analysis of spam relays and scam hosts [3, 30]. It could indicate that these IP ranges are often
abused by attackers and that future research should focus on securing especially these ranges.
We determined the geographical location of each victim by using the Geo-IP tool Maxmind [19].
The distribution of Limbo infections by country is shown in Fig. 4b. We found a total of 175 different
countries and almost one third of the infected machines are located in either Russia or the United States.
ZeuS.We performed a similar analysis for the ZeuS dropzones and the victims infected with this malware.
Fig. 5a lists the top five countries in which the dropzones are located based on 205 dropzones we identified
with our method. Most ZeuS dropzones can be found in North America, Russia, and East Asia – a
results that also applies to the Limbo dropzones. We also found that the dropzones are located in many
different Autonomous Systems (68 different AS in total), but several AS host a larger percentage of
ZeuS dropzones: The three most common AS host 49% of all dropzones, indicating that there are some
providers preferred by the attackers. Presumably those providers offer bullet-proof hosting, i.e., takedown
requests are not handled properly by these providers.
We were able to collect information about 9,480 infected machines from the four dropzones we had
full access to. Based on this data, we can determine the operating system version of each infected machine
since the keylogger also extracts this information. Fig. 5b provides an overview of the operating system
running on the infected machines. The majority of victims run with Windows XP with Service Pack 2,
thus they are not on the latest patch level. A large fraction of machines run on even older version of the
operating system. We also examined the language version of the operating system. Most infected ma-
chines have either English (53.8%) or Spanish (20.2%) as language. Consistent to the machines infected
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(a) Cumulative distribution of IP addresses infected with Limbo.
Country # Machines Percentage
Russia 26,700 16,3%
United States 23,704 14,4%
Spain 20,827 12,7%
United Kingdom 19,240 11,7%
Germany 10,633 6,5%
Poland 8,598 5,4%
Australia 6,568 4,0%
Turkey 5,328 3,2%
Brazil 4,369 2,7%
India 3,980 2,4%
Ukraine 2,674 1,6%
Egypt 2,302 1,4%
Italy 1,632 0,9%
Thailand 1,356 0,8%
Other 26,147 16,0%
(b) Distribution of Limbo infections by country.
Figure 4: Analysis of IP addresses for machines infected with Limbo and their regional distribution.
Country # Dropzones Percentage
United States 34 17%
Russia 29 14%
Netherlands 16 8%
Malaysia 14 7%
China 8 4%
(a) Top countries in which ZeuS dropzones are located.
OS version # Infected Machines %
Windows XP SP2 6,629 70.2 %
Windows XP SP0 1,264 13.1 %
Windows XP SP1 1,146 12.1 %
Windows 2000 SP4 285 3.0 %
Other 156 1.6 %
(b) Distribution of operating system for machines infected with ZeuS.
Figure 5: General statistics for ZeuS dropzones and victims.
with Limbo, the majority of ZeuS infections can be found in the network ranges 58.* – 92.* (56.9%) and
189.* – 220.* (25.8%).
As explained in Sec. 3.3, ZeuS can be dynamically re-configured by the attacker via a configuration
file. The most frequent configurations are shown in Tab. 2. Websites that should be logged are listed in
the first part of the table and the second part enumerates the websites that should be logged and where
a screenshot should be taken. Online banking websites clearly dominate this statistic and indicate that
these attacks aim at stealing credentials for bank accounts. Finally, websites, where no keystrokes should
be recorded are listed at the end of the table. This excluding of websites from the harvesting process is
presumably done in order to minimize the logged data.
4.2 Analysis of Stolen Credentials
Based on the data collected by our monitoring system, we analyzed what kind of credentials are stolen
by keyloggers. This enables a unique point of view into the underground market since we can study what
goods are available for the criminals from a first-hands perspective. We mainly focus on five different
areas: online banking, credit cards, online auctions, email passwords, and social networks. At first sight,
the last two areas do not seem to be very interesting for an attacker. However, especially these two kinds
of stolen credentials can be abused in many ways, e.g., for identity theft, spear phishing, spamming,
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Website # Appearances (205 dropzones)
a) https://internetbanking.gad.de/*/portal?bankid=* 183
https://finanzportal.fiducia.de/*?rzid=*&rzbk=* 177
https://www.vr-networld-ebanking.de/ 176
https://www.gruposantander.es/* 167
@*/login.osmp.ru/* 94
b) @*/login.osmp.ru/* 94
@*/atl.osmp.ru/* 94
@https://*.e-gold.com/* 39
@https://netteller.tsw.com.au/*/ntv45.asp?wci=entry 29
@https://net.dataaction.com.au/802254v45/ntv45.asp?wci=entry 28
c) !http://*myspace.com* 132
!*.microsoft.com/* 98
!http://*odnoklassniki.ru/* 80
!http://vkontakte.ru/* 72
!*microsoft* 18
Table 2: Overview of top five websites a) to be logged, b) to be logged including a screenshot c) not to be
logged.
Goods and services Percentage Range of prices
Bank accounts 22% $10 – $1000
Credit cards 13% $0.40 – $20
Full identities 9% $1 – $15
Online auction site accounts 7% $1 – $8
Email passwords 5% $4 – $30
Drop (request or offer) 5% 10% – 50% of total drop amount
Proxies 5% $1.50 – $30
Table 3: Breakdown of prices for different goods and services available for sale on the underground
market according to a study by Symantec [33]. Percentage indicates how often these goods are offered.
anonymous mail accounts, and other illicit activities. This is also reflected in the market price for these
two types of goods as depicted in Tab. 3 based on a study by Symantec [33].
Identifying which credentials are stolen among the large number of collected data is a challenge. The
key insight is that credentials are typically sent in HTTP POST requests from the victim to the provider. To
find credentials, we thus need to pin-point which requests fields are actually relevant and contain sensitive
information. We use a trick to identify these fields: when a victim enters his credential via the keyboard,
Limbo stores this information together with the current URL. Based on the collected data, we can thus
build provider-specific models MPi that describe which input fields at Pi contain sensitive information.
For example, Mlogin.live.com = {login,passwd} and Mpaypal.com = {login email, login password}.
These models can then be used to search through all collected data to find the credentials, independent
of whether the victim entered the information via the keyboard or they were inserted by a program via
the Protected Storage. In total, we generated 151,070 provider-specific models. These models cover all
domains for which keystrokes were logged by all infected machines. For our analysis, we only used a
subset of all provider-specific models that are relevant for the area we analyzed. We also need to take
typing errors into account: if a victim makes a typing error during the authentication process, this attempt
is not a valid credential and thus we must not include it in our statistics. We implemented this by keeping
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track of which credentials are entered by each victim and only counting each attempt to authenticate at
a specific provider once. For analysis, we also used other methods like pattern matching or heuristics to
find specific credentials as we explain below.
Banking Websites. We used 707 banking models that cover banking sites like Bank of America or
Lloyds Bank, and also e-commerce business platforms like PayPal. These models were chosen based
on the ZeuS configuration files since this keylogger aims specifically at stealing banking credentials. In
total, we found 10,775 unique bank account credentials in all logfiles. Fig. 6a provides an overview of
the top five banking websites for which we found stolen credentials. The distribution has a long tail: for
the majority of banking websites, we found less than 30 credentials.
Banking Website # Stolen Credentials
PayPal 2,263
Commonwealth Bank 851
HSBC Holding 579
Bank of America 531
Lloyds Bank 447
(a) Overview of top five banking websites for which creden-
tials were stolen.
Credit Card Type # Stolen Credit Cards
Visa 3,764
MasterCard 1,431
American Express 406
Diners Club 36
Other 45
(b) Overview of stolen credit card information.
Figure 6: Analysis of stolen banking accounts and credit card data.
ZeuS has the capability to parse specific online banking website to extract further information from
them, e.g., the current account balance. We found 25 unique victims whose account balance was disclosed
this way. In total, these 25 bank accounts hold more than $130,000 in checking and savings (mean value
is $1,768.45, average is $5,225). Based on this data, we can speculate that the attackers can potentially
access millions of dollars on the more than 10,700 compromised bank accounts.
Credit Card Data. To find stolen credit card data, the approach with provider-specific models cannot be
used since a credit card number can be entered on a site with an arbitrary field name. For example, an
American site might use the field name cc number or cardNumber, whereas a Spanish site could use
numeroTarjeta. We thus use a pattern-based approach to identify credit cards and take the syntactic
structure of credit card numbers into account: each credit card has a fixed structure (e.g., MasterCard
numbers are 16 digits and the first two digits are 51-55) that we can identify. Furthermore, the first six
digits of the credit card number are the Issuer Identification Number (IIN) which we can also identify. For
each potential credit card number, we also check the validity with the Luhn algorithm [20], a checksum
formula used to guard against one digit errors in transmission. Passing the Luhn check is only a necessary
condition for card validity and helps us to discard numbers containing typing errors.
With this combination of patterns and heuristics, we found 5,682 valid credit card numbers. Fig. 6b
provides an overview of the different credit card types we found. To estimate the potential loss due to
stolen credit cards we use the median loss amount for credit cards of $298.00 per card as reported in the
2007 Internet Crime Complaint Center’s Internet Crime Report [15]. If we assume that all credit cards
we detected are abused by the attacker, we obtain an estimated loss of funds of almost $1,700,000.
Email Passwords. Large portals and free webmail provider like Yahoo!, Google, Windows Live, or
AOL are among the most popular websites on the Internet: 18 sites of the Alexa Top 50 belong to this
category [2]. Accordingly, we expect that also many credentials are stolen from these kinds of sites. We
used 37 provider-specific models that cover the large sites of this category. In total, we found 149,458
full, unique credentials. We detected many instances where the attackers could harvest many distinct
webmail credentials from just one infected machine. This could indicate infected system in public places,
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e.g., schools or Internet cafes, to which many people have access. Fig. 7a provides an overview of the
distribution for all stolen email credentials.
Webmail Provider # Stolen Credentials
Windows Live 66,540
Yahoo! 27,832
mail.ru 17,599
Rambler 5,379
yandex.ru 5,314
Google 4,783
Other 22,011
(a) Overview of stolen credentials from portals and web-
mail providers.
Social Network # Stolen Credentials
Facebook 14,698
hi5 8,310
nasza-klasa.pl 7,107
odnoklassniki.ru 5,732
Bebo 5,029
YouTube 4,007
Other 33,476
(b) Overview of stolen credentials from social network-
ing sites.
Figure 7: Analysis of stolen credentials from free webmail providers and social networking sites.
Social Networks. Another category of popular sites are social networks like Facebook and MySpace, or
other sites with a social component like YouTube. Of the Alexa Top 50, 14 sites belong to this category.
To analyze stolen credentials from social networks, we used 57 provider-specific models to cover common
sites in this category. In total, we found 78,359 stolen credentials and Fig. 7b provides an overview of the
distribution. Such credentials can for example be used by the attacker for spear phishing attacks.
Online Trading Platforms. The final type of stolen credentials we analyze are online trading platforms.
We used provider-specific models for the big four platforms: eBay, Amazon, Allegro.pl (third biggest
platform world-wide, popular in Poland), and Overstock.com. In total, we found 7,105 credentials that
were stolen from all victims. Of these, the majority belong to eBay with 5,712 and Allegro.pl with 885.
We found another 477 credentials for Amazon and 31 for Overstock.com. This kind of credentials can
for example be used for money laundering.
4.3 Underground Market
The analysis of stolen credentials also enables us to estimate the total value of this information on the
underground market: each credential is a marketable good that can be sold in dedicated forums or IRC
channels [12, 21]. If we multiply the number of stolen credentials with the current market price, we
obtain an estimate of the overall value of the harvested information. Tab. 4 summarizes the results of this
computation. These results are based on market prices as reported by Symantec [33]. Other antivirus
vendors performed similar studies and their estimated market prices for these goods are similar, thus
these prices reflect – to the best of our knowledge – actual prices paid on the underground market for
Stolen credentials Amount Range of prices Range of value
Bank accounts 10,775 $10 – $1000 $107,750 – $10,775,000
Credit cards 5,682 $0.40 – $20 $2,272 – $113,640
Full identities / Social Networks 78,359 $1 – $15 $78,359 – $1,175,385
Online auction site accounts 7,105 $1 – $8 $7,105 – $56,840
Email passwords 149,458 $4 – $30 $597,832 – $4,483,740
Total 224,485 n/a $793,318 – $16,604,605
Table 4: Estimation of total value of stolen credentials recovered during measurement period. Under-
ground market prices are based on a study by Symantec [33].
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(b) Estimated daily earning for attackers
Figure 8: Number of unique stolen credentials and estimated amount of money earned per day due to
harvested keylogger data for three Limbo dropzones. Other dropzones have a similar distribution.
stolen credentials. These results indicate that the information collected during our measurement period is
potentially worth several millions of dollars. Given the fact that we studied just two families of keyloggers
and obtained detailed information about only 70 dropzones (from a total of more than 240 dropzones that
we detected) suggests that the overall size of the underground market is considerably larger.
We also studied the estimated revenue of the individual dropzones. For each dropzone, we computed
the total number of credentials stolen per day given the five categories examined in this paper. Further-
more, we use the range of prices reported by Symantec [33] to estimate the potential daily earnings of the
operator of each dropzone. The results of this analysis are shown exemplarily in Fig. 8 for three different
Limbo dropzones. These dropzones were chosen since we were able to obtain continuous data for more
than four weeks for these sites. However, the distribution for other dropzones is very similar. Fig. 8a
depicts the number of unique stolen credentials per day. This number varies greatly per day, presumably
due to the fact that the malware has a certain rate at which new victims are infected and this rate also
varies per day. We also observe that there is a steady stream of fresh credentials that can then be traded
at the underground market. On the other hand, Fig. 8b provides an overview of the estimated value of
stolen credentials for each particular day. We obtain this estimate by multiplying the number of creden-
tials stolen per day with the lowest market price according to the study by Symantec [33] (see Fig. 3).
This conservative assumption leads to a lower bound of the potential daily income of the attackers. The
results indicate that an attacker can earn several hundred dollars per day based on impersonation attacks
with keyloggers – a seemingly lucrative business.
4.4 Discussion
Besides the five categories discussed in this section, ZeuS and Limbo steal many more credentials and
send them back to the attacker. In total, the collected logfiles contain more than three million unique
keystroke logs. With the provider-specific models examined in the five categories, we only cover the
larger types of attacked sites and high-profile targets. Many more types of stolen sensitive information
against small websites or e-commerce companies are not covered by our analysis. As part of future work,
we plan to extend our analysis and also include an analysis of stolen cookies and the information extracted
from the Protected Storage of the infected machines.
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5 Conclusion and Future Work
In this paper, we introduced a method to analyze impersonation attacks. The technical challenge of the
approach is to automate the analysis process as much as possible and to analyze the large amount of data
collected in this fashion. Based on empirical measurements we showed that attackers steal thousands of
credentials from the infected machines. This stolen data can then be traded on the underground market
and our work provides an insight into this market from a unique point of view.
Our user simulation approach is rather ad-hoc and does not allow us to study all aspects of keyloggers.
The main limitation is that we do not know exactly on which sites the keylogger becomes active and thus
we may miss specific keyloggers. Our empirical results show that keyloggers typically target the main
online banking websites and also extract information from the Protected Storage, and thus we usually
trigger the harvesting phase. Nevertheless, we may miss keyloggers that only steal credentials from a
very limited set of sites. This limitation could be circumvented by using more powerful malware analysis
techniques like multi-path execution [24] or a combination of dynamic and static analysis [17]. Another
limitation is that we do not exactly determine which credentials are stolen. Techniques from the area of
taint tracking [26, 37] can be added to our current system to pinpoint the stolen credentials. Despite these
limitation, the ad-hoc approach works in practice and enables us to study keyloggers as we showed in
Sect. 4. In the future, we plan to extend the current analysis system to include techniques that automate
the analysis phase to an even greater extent.
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A Example of Information Stolen by Limbo/Nethell
Fig.9 contains three examples of credentials stolen by Limbo. The examples are sanitized so that they
do not allow one to draw any conclusions about specific attacks against a particular system, and protect
the identity and privacy of those involved. The first parts shows an example of stolen credentials stored
in the Protected Storage: ZeuS extracts the username/password combination for two specific sites. The
provider-specific model for Windows Live is Mlogin.live.com = {login,passwd} and the second part of
Fig.9 depicts an example for a match for this model. The last part presents an example for stolen cookies
for the domain www.google.com.
a) *******PROTECTED STORAGE*******
Resource: https://ssologon.bankofamerica.com/
Description: AutoComplete Passwords
Username: XXXk8p3
Password: kissXXX
Resource: http://www.myspace.com/
Description: AutoComplete Passwords
Username: cutelaXXX@live.com
Password: alleXXX
b) Timestamp:08.07.2008 22:12:25
[http://login.live.com/login.srf?wa=wsignin1.0[...]
login=KEYLOGGED:leear2XXX.edu KEYSREAD:leear@XXX.edu
[http://login.live.com/login.srf?wa=wsignin1.0[...]
passwd=KEYLOGGED:04uciXX KEYSREAD:04uciXX
[https://login.live.com/ppsecure/post.srf?wa=wsignin1.0[...]
Sign In
PPSX=Pass
PwdPad=IfYouAreReadingThisYouHaveTooMuchF
login=leear@XXX.edu
passwd=04uciXX
LoginOptions=2
PPFT=Bzy3u0imy4JP6WjmRQISrSb3fwF7WDxCHfhHEHZTg74Hzktqk
IP=XXX.181.104.92
ID=08052008_155842_32185906
c) Timestamp:08.07.2008 18:07:54
************COOKIES************
http://www.google.com/ig
PREF=ID=a0567315adb4edXX:TB=5:TM=1137730467:LM=1208466064:
S=4RBtzgEjOVgwH9wP; NID=12=IsSRM11qplYNeeFneEaVGt1F5LUF[...]
Figure 9: Sanitized examples of information stolen by Limbo infections.
19
B Example of Information Stolen by ZeuS/Zbot/Wsnpoem
Fig.10 contains three (sanitized) examples of credentials stolen by ZeuS. The order of examples is the
same as for Limbo: the first part depicts different credentials stolen by abusing the Protected Storage.
The second part shows an example of credentials extracted during the login process of a banking website.
The two fields userid and password belong to the provider-specific model for onlineservices.
wachovia.com. The third part of the example illustrates the logfile for two stolen cookies.
a) [0002] VERSION: 1548 ---------------------------------------------
System time: 09.05.2008 09:37:12, GMT: -4.00, Login time: 00:02:03
Version: 5.1.2600 SP1, Language: 1033
Process: C:\WINDOWS\system32\services.exe
-
Protected Storage:
https://login.comcast.net/login = acesharXXX|downdXXX
https://my.screenname.aol.com/_cqr/login/login.psp = biglamXX|laXX
b) [0739] VERSION: 1289 ---------------------------------------------
System time: 18.06.2008 03:07:55, GMT: -4.00, Login time: 00:05:43
Version: 5.1.2600 SP2, Language: 1033
Process: C:\Program Files\Internet Explorer\iexplore.exe
-
https://onlineservices.wachovia.com/auth/AuthService
Referer: -
Keys: www.wachovia.com julXXX mckinXXX minimXXX july2XXX
Data:
action=uidLogin
bi=version%3D1%26pm_fpua%3Dmozilla%2F4.0 %28compatible%3B msie 7.0
windows nt 5.1%3B .net clr 1.0.3705%3B .net clr 1.1.4322%3Bmedia
center pc 4.0%29%7C4.0 %28compatible%3B MSIE 7.0%3B Windows[...]
requestTimestamp=1213758461593
homepage=yes
userid=julXXXmckinXXX
password=july2XXX
systemtarget=gotoOSH
c) IE Cookies:
Path: google.com /
PREF=ID=d9361e071b3ebeXX:TM=1214675597:LM=1214675597:S=COFeRz[...]
Path: yahoo.com / B=3eju00t46cv1v&b=3&s=au
Figure 10: Sanitized examples of information stolen by ZeuS infections.
We also present some more statistical information for the ZeuS dropzones in this section. Table 5
lists the banking websites that the attackers are most interested in (based on the configuration files we
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found). Fiducia and OSMP are actually not banks, but German and Russian providers of fare man-
agement systems, therefore they are marked in italics. Two different domains are used by Volks- und
Raiffeisenbanken – a German bank – for online banking. Many ZeuS dropzones are configured to mon-
itor these two domains, so that the portion of Volks- und Raiffeisenbanken is very high in this statistic:
on the one hand, this is internetbanking.gad.de (183 times in the configuration files) and on the
other hand www.vr-networld-ebanking.de (177 times in the configuration files). Furthermore,
one large customer of Fiducia is Volks- und Raiffeisenbanken. Similar to the results for the dropzone
locations, most banks can be found in North America, Europe, and Asia.
Bank # Appearance Country
Volks- and Raiffeisenbanken 360 Germany
OSMP 306 Russia
Santander Central Hispano 256 Spain
Fiducia 196 Germany
ABN AMRO Bank 107 Netherlands
Citigroup 105 United States
Table 5: Top five banking sites that should be monitored for credentials.
Among the possibility to specify websites to log or not to log, ZeuS also allows to specify hostnames
in the configuration files, which should be blocked on an infected machine. Often this technique is used
in order to affect functional efficiency of locally installed anti-virus engines, as shown in Table 6. In-
terestingly, the two domains lem0n.info and i-nt-e-r-n-e-t.com belong to other ZeuS dropzones
which indicate rivalry amongst the attackers: on an infected machine, the access to other dropzones is
blocked such that multiple infections of a single machine can be prevented.
Site # Appearance
microsoft.com 159
kaspersky.com 126
norton.com 108
lem0n.info 93
i-nt-e-r-n-e-t.com 93
Table 6: Top five malicious host-file entries.
In addition to the logging functionality, ZeuS can be configured to perform man-in-the-middle attacks.
Inside the configuration file exists one particular record containing several websites. If the user visits one
of these sites, ZeuS reroutes this request to another fake site under the control of the attacker. The victim
does not notice this rerouting since it is transparent to the user. This enables efficient phishing attacks
since the attacker can use additional social engineering tricks at the fake site to trick the victim into
disclosing even more credentials. The most frequently rerouted websites are shown in Table 7.
Site # Appearance
https://sitekey.bankofamerica.com/sas/signon.do 35
https://www.unicaja.es/PortalServlet*pag=1110902071492* 33
https://www.gruposantander.es/bog/sbi 33
https://www.bancaja.*/ControlParticulares 33
Table 7: Top seven sites that are target of a man-in-the-middle attack.
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